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The Center of Excellence SAFE – “Sustainable Architecture 
for Finance in Europe” – is a cooperation of the Center for 
Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt. It is 
funded by the LOEWE initiative of the State of Hessen 
(Landes-Offensive zur Entwicklung wissenschaftlich-öko-
nomischer Exzellenz). SAFE brings together more than 40 
professors and just as many junior researchers who are all 
dedicated to conducting research in support of a sustainable 
financial architecture. The Center has two main pillars: 
excellent research on all important topics related to finance; 
and policy advice, including the dissemination of relevant 
research findings to European decision makers from the 
realms of politics, regulation and administration.
In order to promote a fruitful exchange with interested par-
ties from politics, academia, business and the media, SAFE 
issues a newsletter on a quarterly basis. This aims to provide 
an overview of the Center‘s ongoing research and policy ac-
tivities. The SAFE Newsletter succeeds the House of Finance 
Newsletter, which was published between 2009 and 2012. 
SAFE is based at Goethe University’s House of Finance how-
ever extends beyond by drawing on scholars from other 
parts of Goethe University as well as from fellow research 
institutions. The Center builds on the reputation of the 
House of Finance institutions, serving as an interdiscipli-
nary think tank on the issue of finance.
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Content
Our Center of Excellence SAFE has already stretched out its arms 
extensively into the finance research community, broadly defined. 
Even the single act of advertising several professorships at once has 
caused a great stir in the job market, drawn considerable attention 
to Frankfurt, and mobilized many of our faculty members. We are 
now on track to fill six junior professorships and seven post-doc 
positions by the end of the summer, and we are looking forward 
to welcoming six new full professors by January 2014 at the latest.
In addition, the SAFE Visitors Center has already built up a solid 
record of bringing to Frankfurt international visitors of a high qual-
ity and profile. In the past five months, six researchers from abroad 
have visited SAFE and the House of Finance for a period of between 
one  week  and  several  months:  three “senior  visitors”  and  three 
junior ones. As “senior visitors”, we invite distinguished colleagues 
to give a Ph.D.-level mini course and either a seminar or a public 
lecture, but also to enter into an exchange of thoughts and ideas 
with us, both faculty and students. “Junior visitors” are promising 
post-docs whom we welcome to further their own research projects 
here and to gain experience in one of the research areas of SAFE.
In May, our most recent senior visitor, Prof. Fernando Alvarez of the 
University of Chicago, spent two weeks at our Center. In 2012, he 
was awarded the prestigious Duisenberg Research Fellowship of 
the European Central Bank. While visiting SAFE, he taught courses 
on household portfolio-saving models and the optimal disclosure 
of interconnected banks. Simon Kwan, Vice President and Head   
of Financial Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco   
visited  us  in  April.  He  almost  bumped  into  Alejandro  Drexler, 
an  Assistant  Professor  of  Finance  at  the  McCombs  School  of   
Business of the University of Texas at Austin, and Menachem Abudy,   
an  Assistant  Professor  at  Israel’s  Bar-Ilan  University.  Kimmo   
Soramäki, CEO of Financial Network Analytics (FNA), visited SAFE   
in January and February and gave courses on financial networks 
and “financial cartography”. 
Hard as it is to call “visitor” somebody we view as one of our own, 
we are happy to have with us Christian Leuz, Professor of Inter-
national Economics, Finance and Accounting at the University of 
Chicago Booth School of Business – a leading scholar in the field 
of  capital  markets  regulation  and  accounting  transparency.  Last 
year, Christian was bestowed the Humboldt Research Award, which 
enabled him to spend the whole academic year 2012/13 with us. Not 
only is it a great pleasure to have him on board, his presence has led 
to a number of highly interesting courses and seminars, and also 
added to other academic and policy events. To give you an overview 
of what he is working on, we showcase some of his recent research 
on the next two pages. 
I hope you will enjoy reading this issue of the SAFE News  letter and 
that  you  will  share  my  view  that  the  future  (of  finance-related   
research at Goethe University) is even better than it used to be!
Yours sincerely,
Michael Haliassos
Michael Haliassos 
Director, Center of  
Excellence SAFE
Editorial4
In recent years, reporting under International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) has be-
come mandatory in many countries. The 
capital  market  effects  around  this  change 
have  been  studied  extensively,  but  the 
sources of these effects are not yet well un-
derstood.  Our  paper  provides  a  series  of 
tests that distinguish between various pos-
sible explanations for the capital market ef-
fects that have been observed. Given the con-
tinued trend towards IFRS reporting, a better 
understanding of the consequences of IFRS 
adoption is of fundamental importance to 
researchers, policy makers and regulators.
The worldwide switch to IFRS reporting is arguably 
the biggest reporting change in accounting history. 
Much of the literature points towards positive capi-
tal market effects around the introduction of IFRS, 
but also shows that these effects are significantly 
stronger in countries with stricter and better func-
tioning legal systems, and more pronounced in the 
European Union (EU) than in other regions of the 
world  (see,  for  example,  Daske  et  al.,  2008,  and 
Byard et al., 2011). This variation makes it unlikely 
that  only  the  accounting  standards  are  at  work. 
Moreover, many countries adopted IFRS reporting 
at around the same time. This clustering in the 
timing of standards adoption makes it difficult to 
empirically isolate the effects of IFRS reporting. 
Studies analyzing the capital market impact of 
IFRS reporting could be confounded by unrelated 
institutional  changes  and/or  economic  shocks 
that  happened  to  occur  during  the  same  time   
period. For example, the EU passed a series of   
directives to improve financial market regulation, 
many of which were implemented around the 
time of IFRS adoption (see Figure 1). 
It is also possible that institutional changes are 
explicitly linked with IFRS adoption. For example, 
the  EU  law  introducing  IFRS  reporting  requires 
that Member States take appropriate measures to 
ensure compliance. As a result, EU Member States 
may have bundled IFRS adoption with changes in 
financial  reporting  enforcement.  Such  changes 
raise the possibility that the observed capital mar-
ket impact reflects enforcement changes, rather 
than the switch in accounting standards.
Thus,  it  is  still  an  open  question  whether  the   
capital market benefits around mandatory IFRS 
adoption  are  indeed  attributable  to  what  are   
arguably  improved  and  globally  harmonized   
accounting standards.
Empirical Approach
We use panel data techniques to analyze quar-
terly market liquidity data and rely on within- and 
across-country  variation  in  the  timing  of  IFRS 
adoption and that of other institutional changes 
to  distinguish  between  several  possible  expla-
nations. We analyze market liquidity for several 
reasons: it has a clear theoretical link to reporting 
quality; it can be measured over short intervals; 
and it is less anticipatory in nature than other eco-
nomic constructs like cost of capital. 
Specifically, we explore four potential explanations 
for the capital market effects observed: (i) the switch 
from local rules to IFRS reporting played a primary 
role in positive effects; (ii) the IFRS mandate had   
capital market benefits only in countries with strong 
institutions and legal enforcement; (iii) countries 
that support the introduction of IFRS with changes 
in enforcement see stronger capital market effects; 
and (iv) other changes in the institutional environ-
ment than the switch to IFRS and/or economic shocks 
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unrelated to financial reporting are responsible for 
the positive effects observed. The study is designed to 
distinguish between these four explanations.
Results
We show that, across all countries, mandatory IFRS 
reporting had little impact on liquidity. The liquidity 
effects around IFRS adoption are concentrated in 
the countries of the EU. However, we find little 
evidence that unrelated changes in EU financial 
market  regulation  and/or  economic  shocks  can 
explain the observed liquidity effects, which largely 
rules out explanation (iv).
Next, we show that liquidity effects are confined to 
those EU countries that made substantive changes 
to enforcement around the time they introduced 
IFRS, which is consistent with (iii). The magnitude of 
the coefficient estimates suggests an increase in 
liquidity of between 18 and 23 percent relative to 
pre-IFRS  liquidity  levels,  which  can  be  translated 
into average trading cost savings of between USD 
0.35 and 1.5 million per year and sample firm.
Our  results  are  inconsistent  with  the  hypothesis 
that mandatory IFRS reporting has widespread capi-
tal market benefits in all countries or only in coun-
tries where pre-existing legal institutions are strong 
and regulatory quality is high, which rules out ex-
planations (i) and (ii). Instead, the results suggest 
that  changes  in  financial  reporting  enforcement 
play a crucial role for the liquidity effects observed 
(explanation (iii)). We find further evidence for this 
interpretation  by  exploiting  the  fact  that  some 
firms had already reported under IFRS on a volun-
tary basis and should have experienced only minor 
(or  no)  changes  in  accounting  standards  when 
IFRS reporting became mandatory. We show that 
liquidity  increases  for  voluntary  IFRS  adopters 
around the time of the IFRS mandate only in coun-
tries with concurrent enforcement changes.
In addition, we analyze liquidity effects in countries 
that  changed  their  enforcement  before  or  after 
adopting IFRS, but not simultaneously, so that the 
effects of IFRS and enforcement changes can be in-
vestigated separately. The results show that liquidity 
improves after substantive changes in enforcement 
but not after IFRS adoption.
Conclusion
In sum, our results generally support explanation (iii) 
and suggest that changes in enforcement were cru-
cial for the liquidity improvements after the intro-
duction of the IFRS mandate. This evidence does not 
necessarily imply that IFRS reporting plays no role. 
One may argue that IFRS reporting was a pre-condi-
tion for the enforcement changes to take place or,   
alternatively, that the liquidity effects would have 
been smaller without IFRS adoption. However, our 
results make it unlikely that the change in accounting 
standards was the primary driver, or a major factor, 
behind the liquidity effects around IFRS adoption.
These findings highlight the importance of enforce-
ment institutions for global reporting practices. In 
addition, they should make us (more) cautious about 
attributing the observed capital market effects to 
IFRS adoption. Consistent with this conclusion, Daske 
et al. (2013) examine the capital market effects of 
voluntary IFRS adoptions by firms prior to the man-
date and find that the effects around IFRS adoption 
often reflect changes in firms’ reporting incentives 
or broader changes in their reporting strategies, and 
not just the switch in standards.
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Figure 1: Timeline of selected European regulatory changes around IFRS adoption
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The contractual relation between venture 
capitalists and their portfolio firms has re-
ceived growing attention in recent years. It 
offers the possibility to study the role of   
explicit  contracts  in  an  environment  of 
complex informational asymmetries and 
control problems. While there are many 
theoretical analyses on contract design, 
empirical studies looking into the details   
of contractual arrangements, and thereby   
relating theory with real world data, are still 
rather rare. This study aims to fill this gap.
In  this  particular  context,  the  question  arises  of 
whether there exists a prototypical venture capi-
tal (VC) contract or, rather, whether contracts dif -
fer persistently across VC firm types and countries. 
Therefore, the main objective of our study is to in-
vestigate differences in corporate governance and 
the design of contracts between venture capitalists 
and their portfolio firms across VC firm types.
Observing different contract approaches between 
different VC firm types does not necessarily imply 
that different types of venture capitalists apply 
different corporate governance approaches. The   
observed differences may also be due to a selection 
effect. Different types of venture capitalists finance 
different types of firms and thus need to use differ -
ent types of contracts. Hence, it is crucial to disen-
tangle the firm selection effects and the actual dif -
ferences in the corporate governance approaches 
between VC firm types. In order to do so, the present 
study will apply different matching procedures.
Typology of VC Firms 
The literature distinguishes between two types 
of venture capitalists: independent VC firms, which 
share the common objective of maximizing only 
monetary returns, and captive VC firms, whose   
objectives  are  complementary  to  the  “assets” 
of the largest investor in the captive VC entity. 
These differences in objective entail that captive 
and independent venture capitalists finance dif-
ferent companies and develop different financing 
skills. Hence, each type of VC firm should have 
its own specific corporate governance approach 
and its own contract design.
Indeed, the literature has underlined these dif-
ferences. Independent VC firms are normally ac-
tive investors and thus tend to hold significant 
control  rights  and  use  contract  mechanisms 
which allow for active intervention (see, for ex-
ample, Cumming and Johan, 2009). Captive ven-
ture capitalists, on the other hand, provide less 
active  support  to  their  portfolio  firms.  Hence, 
our first hypothesis is  that contracts between 
captive  venture  capitalists  and  their  portfolio 
firms  reflect  this  and  include  fewer  measures 
that allow for active intervention on the part of 
the venture capitalist.
Furthermore,  the  academic  literature  often 
states that there also exist differences in corpo-
rate governance among the group of indepen-
dent venture capitalists. It is noted, for example, 
that, in Europe, nationally operating VC firms are 
less hands-on than their internationally oriented 
counterparts  (see,  for  example,  Landier,  2003). 
Our second hypothesis aims at investigating the 
claim that international venture capitalists pro-
vide – via contract design – more monitoring and 
advice to their portfolio companies. 
Empirical Approach
For  the  analysis,  we  use  a  proprietary,  hand- 
collected data set from the German KfW Banken-
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gruppe,  which  supports  innovative  German 
firms by promoting venture capital investments. 
Venture capitalists have to apply for this support 
by submitting the key details of their relation-
ship with the portfolio firm, most notably, the 
term sheets, the business plans and the share-
holder  agreements  involved.  This  gave  us  the 
unique opportunity to collect detailed informa-
tion  on  the  relationship  between  the  venture 
capitalist and its portfolio firm based on actual 
contract data.
The existing empirical research on venture capital 
issues normally limits itself to taking into account 
an unspecified potential VC firm type effect (re-
garding contract design, investment behavior, ac-
tive engagement as well as performance) by using 
different dummy variables or by looking into the 
differences  in  contracts  between  types  of  ven-
ture capitalists (see, for example, Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2006). In order to disentangle the 
corporate governance effect and the selection 
effect, we apply a matching approach. Rather 
than only testing for the significance of such a 
dummy variable for VC firm type, we are able to 
give a comprehensive picture of the differences 
in contract design between types of VC firms   
after controlling for selection.
No Prototypical VC Contract
Our main finding is that there is no prototypi-
cal VC contract, but that there exist significant 
differences in corporate governance across the 
different  types  of  VC  firms,  even  when  these   
are  financing  similar  companies.  In  fact,  inde-
pendent  venture  capitalists  use  significantly 
more contract mechanisms that allow for active 
intervention  than  captive  venture  capitalists, 
though the differences are not significant with 
respect to control mechanisms. So, our first hy-
pothesis is partially supported by the data.
In addition, our results confirm our second hy-
pothesis that international independent venture 
capitalists are – via the design of their contracts – 
more  active  relative  to  national  counterparts 
providing more advice to their portfolio firms. 
Nevertheless,  the  differences  with  respect  to 
monitoring are much less pronounced.
Furthermore, these results have important im-
plications for cross-country comparisons. They 
show  that  observed  differences  in  contract  
design  may  rather  be  due  to  differences  in  
the market composition of the respective VC 
industries  than  due  to  actual  differences  in  
the  behavior  of  specific  types  of  VC  firms.  
Given that there are no legal or institutional 
peculiarities  pertaining  to  the  German  VC  
market, we think that our results can be ap-
plied in a rather straightforward way to other 
VC markets even if they do not display such  
a wide variation in VC firm types.
Besides  the  fact  that  our  results  have  impor-
tant lessons regarding differences in corporate  
governance  approaches  across  different  types 
of  VC  companies,  they  also  have  important  
implications for assessing observed changes in 
contract design over time. Our findings imply 
that it is crucial to relate changes in contract  
design over time not only to learning effects but 
also to potential changes in the composition of 
the VC pool with respect to different types of 
VC firms. This is also crucial for cross-country 
comparisons  of  VC  contracts  because  differences 
here  may  also  be  due  to  differences  in  the  
composition of the VC market and not (only) to 
the varying level of sophistication of the ven-
ture capitalists present.
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Figure 1: Contract design features across different types of venture capital firms
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The genesis of the current financial crisis 
can be traced back to the housing sector. 
Easy access to cheap mortgage credit re-
sulting from lax mortgage underwriting 
standards,  coupled  with  liberal  govern-
ment mortgage lending policies, increased 
the demand for housing, causing an un-
precedented  rise  in  home  prices  –  the 
housing  price  bubble.  Indeed,  the  2003 
American  Dream  Downpayment  Initia-
tive  provided  increased  financing  for  
low income families. Between 2004 and 
2007, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac be-
came  the  largest  buyers  of  subprime  
and  Alt-A  mortgages,  stimulating  the 
growth of the subprime mortgage mar-
ket.  Following  several  legislative  initia-
tives,  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddie  Mac  
purchased  over  USD  6  trillion  of  mort-
gages from 1992 to 2008. This growth in  
housing  prices  was  not  sustainable.  As  
interest  rates  rose,  subprime  mortgage 
defaults eventually increased to unprece-
dented levels, and because the supply of 
new  home  buyers  became  exhausted, 
home prices collapsed.
We  develop  a  micro-based  macro  model  for 
residential  home  prices  in  an  economy  where 
defaults  on  residential  mortgages  negatively 
affect housing prices. Our model enables us to 
study the impact of subprime defaults on prime 
borrowers  and  the  impact  of  various  govern-
ment policies on the housing market boom and 
bust  cycle. We  show  that  subprime  mortgage 
defaults,  via  their  impact  on  aggregate  hous-
ing prices and aggregate incomes, increase the 
incidence of prime mortgage defaults. There is a 
subprime default contagion effect. Secondly, we 
show the relative impact of various government 
fiscal and monetary policies for improving the 
housing market.
Although much has been written on measuring 
the effects of house prices on foreclosures and 
lending  channels  (e.g.  Campbell,  Giglio  and 
Pathak,  2009),  less  has  been  written  on  the   
effect of housing prices on the macroeconomy. 
Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2011) examine the nega-
tive price and real effects of foreclosures on du-
rable consumption and residential investment. 
Favilukis,  Ludvigson  and  Van  Nieuwerburgh 
(2012) develop a two-sector general equilibrium 
model  with  production  in  housing  and  non-
housing sectors to study the determination of 
equilibrium interest rates and aggregate output. 
The Impact of Subprime Mortgage Defaults
Our  paper  extends  this  growing  literature 
by  building  a  micro-based  macro  model  that   
captures  the  impact  of  the  housing  sector  in 
terms  of  changing  prices  and  foreclosures  on 
macroeconomic variables, such as interest rates 
and  aggregate  income.  In  this  regard,  we  con-
struct a dynamic simulation model wherein we 
can  analyze  the  impact  of  subprime  mortgage 
defaults  on  prime  defaults,  housing  prices,  in-
terest rates and aggregate income. This, in turn,   
enables us to study the relative impact of vari-
ous  government  policies  on  these  evolutions. 
The  policies  affect  the  economy  through  ex-
ogenous  shifts  to  particular  parameters  in  the   
relevant evolutions and thereby have an impact 
on default rates and house prices. The simulat-
ed  evolutions  capture  the  equilibrium  dynam-
ics  in  the  economy  because  the  evolutions  are   
calibrated  to  market  data  using  direct  estima-
tion,  wherever  possible,  and  the  parameters  of 
previous studies, where necessary. Furthermore, 
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these simulations enable us to address the rela-
tive  impact  of  various  governmental  policies, 
such  as  monetary  policy,  easy  credit,  and  tax   
rebates on home prices and mortgage defaults.
The economy underlying our simulation model 
consists of four markets: (i) aggregate produc-
tion,  represented  by  aggregate  income;  (ii)  a 
bond  market,  represented  by  the  riskless  spot 
rate of interest; (iii) the housing market, repre-
sented  by  an  aggregate  housing  price  index; 
and (iv) a mortgage market. All four markets are 
represented by the evolution of correlated price 
processes subject  to  the same random shocks 
across time. All four markets’ price processes are 
interrelated, with feedback loops in both direc-
tions, except in the case of the bond market.
The mortgage market consists of a finite num-
ber  of  borrowers,  each  of  whom  purchases  
a house. The borrowers are of two types: prime 
or  subprime.  Prime  borrowers  have  a  higher 
credit quality. The personal income process for 
a borrower depends on his credit quality and  
the  economy’s  aggregate  income.  The  higher 
aggregate income and credit quality, the more 
extensive the borrower’s personal income pro-
cess, all else being constant (see Figure 1). All 
borrowers are issued fixed rate mortgage loans 
where the loan rate and down payment depend 
on the borrower’s credit quality. The higher the 
credit quality, the lower the loan rate and the 
higher the down payment. 
How to Defuse a Bursting Bubble
To understand the impact of various regulatory 
policies,  such  as  monetary  policy,  easy  credit, 
and  tax  rebates  on  housing  prices  and  mort-
gage defaults, we calibrate the parameters of 
this system to match those in the U.S. economy, 
and we simulate the various paths implied by 
our  dynamic  economy.  Our  first  comparative 
static documents the impact of these policies 
on reducing the impact of a bursting home price 
bubble,  while  the  second  comparative  static 
studies  whether  these  government  policies 
can  create  such  bubbles.  Fiscal  policies  relat-
ing to direct government rebates or a loosening 
of borrowing standards have less of an impact 
than monetary policy.
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Figure 1: Monthly income level under the bubble scenario for different economies.
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Of the three major institutional projects 
being planned under the overall Banking 
Union  for  Europe  (common  banking 
super  vision,  bank  restructuring  and  de-
posit insurance), the creation of a Euro-
pean deposit guarantee scheme faces the 
strongest political reservations. Joint and 
several liability beyond national borders – 
be it with regard to the liabilities of indi-
vidual  states  or  the  protection  of  bank 
depositors – faces significant opposition. 
Also from an economic perspective, there 
are strong reasons against a comprehen-
sive mutualization of liability. There is the 
danger that a general assumption of lia-
bility by a European structure would nega-
tively  impact  the  efforts  necessary  at 
the national level to control and contain 
banking risks.
However, it should not be forgotten that there 
are also important reasons in support of a merger 
of national deposit guarantee schemes. The lim-
ited  credibility  of  a  national  deposit  guarantee 
scheme must be mentioned here – especially if 
the economies concerned are small or cover only 
a few individual institutions. The weak protection 
offered by small states to their depositors creates 
the risk of an (in)solvency nexus between banks 
and  states.  Furthermore,  due  to  the  increasing 
number  of  institutions  active  in  retail  banking 
across Europe,  there is a growing risk of crisis-
related contagion effects that extend beyond na-
tional borders.
Arising from the above is the demand for a solu-
tion to the European liability problem that meets 
two  requirements:  First,  the  deposit  guarantee 
scheme should present a credible protection of de-
posits. Second, the mutualization of liability must 
be designed such that moral hazard is minimized.
The Current Two-Stage Model
The existing model for a European deposit guar-
antee scheme – the so-called “two-stage model” – 
only meets the first of these two requirements. 
A simple assumption of the liability for the savings 
deposits of all of Europe’s banks by a European 
fund would indeed have a liability mutualization 
effect – including the above-mentioned negative 
risk incentives. For this reason, a replacement of a 
national deposit guarantee scheme by a compre-
hensive European solution is to be rejected just as 
much as a two-stage solution, whereby European 
protection is second to the existing national pro-
tection. This is because, under a two-stage solu-
tion, moral hazard is not only particularly high, but 
also related to a lax first stage of national deposit 
insurance – and is thus particularly problematic. 
Both a one-stage and a two-stage concept for a 
European deposit guarantee scheme rightly meet 
with great political resistance and probably have 
little prospect of realization.
A Three-Stage  Scheme  with  Limited  European   
Reinsurance
The alternative three-stage model presented here 
includes  two essential structural innovations: a 
European reinsurance at the second stage of in-
surance, and a national government insurance for 
major losses at the third and ultimate stage of 
the insurance scheme.
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Stage 1 consists of the existing national deposit 
guarantee model in a largely unchanged man-
ner. Bank deposits of up to a certain amount – 
e.g. EUR 20,000 – are insured under this scheme. 
The national fund charges risk-related fees from 
its member banks and accumulates capital in a 
special fund. The fund is backed by a guarantee 
of the national government. Furthermore, sub-
sequent to a damage incidence, it can raise con-
tributions by way of special charges. 
Stage  2  takes  over  the  excess  losses  up  to  a   
pre-specified maximum amount per account, or 
per  account  holder.  For  example,  the  liability 
of  this  second  stage  could  be  limited  to   
EUR 100,000. Over time, sufficient guarantee as-
sets will also be built up in a dedicated reserve 
fund, financed via risk-related fees and, where 
necessary,  special  charges.  With  an  insurance 
covering  deposits  between  EUR  20,000  and   
EUR  100,000,  this  second  European  stage  of 
the  alternative  proposal  operates  similar  to  a 
disaster reinsurance scheme: damages beyond 
those  assumed  by  the  primary  insurance  will 
be  covered  up  to  a  predetermined  maximum 
amount.
Stage 3 involves those major damages arising from 
bank insolvencies which exceed the scope of the 
national primary insurance plus the European re-
insurance. For these cases, it is foreseen that claims 
above the coverage provided are, in turn, charged 
to the national treasury. In other words, the first 
and last stages of the alternative proposal will be 
covered by national funds. The middle stage of the 
European deposit guarantee concept, in contrast, 
will be covered at the common, European level.
Further Considerations
•  The extent of the European liability on stage 2 
should vary in size according to the home state 
of an institution, for example, being a multiple 
of  the  national  deposit  guarantee  provided 
under the first stage. If this multiple were to be 
“four”,  then  the  European  protection  would 
account for a further EUR 80,000 above the 
EUR 20,000 secured at the national level.
•  The two lower stages would each charge their 
own premium, which allows for the build-up of 
an appropriate asset base. Over time, these fund 
assets would lend credibility to the commitments 
made under the deposit guarantee scheme. 
•  For a transitional period, the provisioning of 
the asset base could be made possible by a 
loan from the ESM. The loan would be paid off 
gradually whilst the asset base is slowly built 
up via premiums and special charges. 
•  With  regard  to  the  national  first  stage,  it 
should be ensured that there is a level playing   
field. All national organizations should feature 
comparably high premiums and a building up 
of asset volumes in order to ensure that re-
course to European reinsurance follows a com-
parably high own contribution.
The full article is available at: 
http://safe-frankfurt.de/policy-publications 
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A Behavioral Perspective on 
Transparency
On 15 and 16 March, the SAFE Transparency Lab 
(Program  Director:  Guido  Friebel),  co-organized 
the  European  Workshop  on  Experimental  and  
Behavioral  Economics  that  brought  together 
views on some of the behavioral foundations for   
transparency.  Under  the  heading  “Information, 
Communication,  Transparency:  Foundations  for 
Financial Decisions”, the presentations and discus-
sions focused on transparency issues related to the 
financial markets and consumer behavior.
About 50 experimental economists, including 19 
PhD  candidates,  from  nine  countries  presented 
and discussed new academic work in this area. The 
research  presented  dealt,  among  other  issues, 
with investors’ financial decision making, the costs 
and  benefits  of  delegated  regulation,  the  emer-
gence and implications of money illusion, and the 
psychological costs of cheating. One of the lessons 
drawn from the experimental evidence in the lab 
and elsewhere is that, where investors and con-
sumers  are  lacking  information  about  relevant 
para  meters, such as the profitability or risk expo-
sure of assets or the behavior of the people man-
aging them, a financial system will ultimately be 
destabilized. Transparency appears to be an impor-
tant input into the stability of a financial system, 
and a lack of transparency constitutes a dangerous   
trigger  for  crisis.  This  applies  to  subprime  real 
estate and government bonds alike. 
Call for Proposals: Austerity 
and Economic Growth
SAFE is calling for proposals for academic research 
projects on “Austerity and Economic Growth: Con-
cepts for Europe”. The objective is to promote papers 
that examine the nature of the relationship between 
austerity, debt sustainability and growth. A special 
focus will be on the impact of austerity programs on 
the real economy and the effects on consumption, 
investment, jobs and growth. Researchers are invit-
ed to submit proposals with a compact research out -
line. An international committee of high-calibre ref-
erees  chaired  by  Alfons  Weichenrieder  will  select 
five projects to receive a grant of EUR 10,000 each. 
The researchers will be asked to present their work 
at a SAFE conference in Frankfurt and to transfer 
their results to a policy publication. Deadline for sub-
mission  is  August  31st.  More  information  can  be 
found on the SAFE website.
SAFE hosts May Meeting of  
Review of Economic Studies
On 13 and 14 May, the Center of Excellence SAFE 
hosted a May meeting of The Review of Economic 
Studies at Goethe University’s House of Finance – 
one of three in Europe. Every year since 1989, in 
line with the Review’s tradition of encouraging the 
work of young economists, seven of the world’s 
most  promising  doctoral  students  in  economics 
and finance have been selected to present their 
research  at  major  universities  across  Europe. 
Among this year’s presenters were graduates from 
Harvard  University,  Yale  University,  MIT,  Colum-
bia University and Northwestern University. The 
Frankfurt meeting was organized by Nicola Fuchs-
Schündeln,  coordinator  of  the  SAFE  Graduate 
Program and a member of the Review’s Editorial 
Board, as well as Ctirad Slavik, Assistant Professor 
of Macroeconomic Theory.  
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Controversial Debate on  
Banking Regulation
 
On  19  April,  Theodor  Weimer,  Board  Spokesman 
of the HypoVereinsbank, and Jan Pieter Krahnen, 
Director of the Center of Excellence SAFE and the 
Center for Financial Studies, discussed the impli-
cations  of  new  banking  regulations  on  systemic 
stability and competition. The talk was part of the 
SAFE Policy Center series on structural reforms in 
the European banking sector.
Weimer admitted that the banking sector had ta-
ken too much risk before the crisis while having 
only a low capital endowment. Therefore, a better 
regulation of the banking sector is necessary. Re-
gulators should, however, take care that they do 
not threaten the existence of smaller banks by im-
posing too many costly rules. As an example, Wei-
mer pointed to the Liikanen Group’s recommenda-
tion to separate commercial banking and market 
making activities from customer-related business. 
Krahnen, who was in fact a member of the Liikanen 
Group,  replied  that  this  recommendation  was 
necessary to make bank resolution possible even if 
banks are linked to each other. However, he rejected 
the “Liikanen light” proposal of the German govern -
ment that plans to cut off proprietary trading, but 
not  trading  on  behalf  of  customers  and  market 
making. Splitting up these activities is nearly impos-
sible, Krahnen said. He added that if this proposal 
were to be implemented, disproportionate costs 
would arise in relation to the increase in stability. 
Brigitte Haar appointed to the 
BaFin Administrative Council
Brigitte Haar, Chair of Private 
Law,  German,  European,  and 
International  Business  Law, 
Law and Finance, and Compa-
rative  Law,  has  been  appoin-
ted  to  the  BaFin  (Germany‘s 
Federal  Financial  Superviso-
ry  Authority)  Administrative 
Council for a five-year term by the Federal Ministry 
of Finance. Apart from its responsibility to decide 
on BaFin’s budget, the Administrative Council has 
the  task  to  monitor  the  organization’s  manage-
ment and to advise the BaFin with regard to its 
supervisory duties.
Journal of Accounting Research 
Conference in Frankfurt
In a one-off departure from the longstanding tra-
dition of holding the conference in Chicago, the 
2013  Journal  of  Accounting  Research  Conference 
was held at Goethe University in Frankfurt on 17 
and  18  May.  The  conference  was  organized  by 
Christian Leuz (Chicago Booth School of Business 
and SAFE) with the support of the SAFE Transpar-
ency Lab.  More than 150 accounting researchers 
from  leading  US  departments  discussed  current 
research. Topics included the impact of frequent 
reporting  on  managerial  short-termism,  the  ef-
fects of information shocks on dividend payouts, 
and  borrowers’  disclosure  behavior  when  bank 
health  is  declining.  The  day  before  the  confer-
ence, 30 PhD students and faculty members from 
Chicago  Booth  and  Goethe  University  met  at  a 
workshop in which students presented their work 
and collected suggestions on how to improve. The 
Transparency  Lab  will  continue  this  format  for 
upcoming events.13
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The  financial  crisis  starting  in  2007  un-
avoidably  triggered  memories  of  the 
Great Depression and its dire economic, 
political  and  social  consequences.  From 
the  many  studies  on  that  period,  one 
clear  message  has  emerged:  the  follies 
of  that  time  must  be  avoided,  and  the 
world must be saved from a repetition of 
that disaster. As a result, all major central 
banks reduced their interest rates to ex-
ceptionally low levels. In fact, the expan-
sionary  monetary  policy  was  extended 
beyond  the  zero  bound  by  also  imple-
menting several kinds of so-called “un-
orthodox” measures.
This timely reaction to the crisis prevented the col-
lapse. However, exit from unorthodox measures 
is a daunting challenge. In the context of the zero 
bound, it is very difficult to calculate the mon-
etary policy stance and the impact of any changes 
–  withdrawing  liquidity  and/or  raising  interest 
rates? How will markets react? The process is com-
plicated by the fact that a period of extremely low 
interest  rates  contributes  to  higher  risk-taking, 
masks underlying weaknesses in balance sheets, 
and makes the financial sector increasingly vul-
nerable to a change of regime. 
Extremely low interest rates also have an effect 
on  governments:  they  are  hardly  conducive  to 
fiscal discipline. And huge stocks of government 
bonds expose central banks to economic risks and 
political pressure. Paradoxical as it seems, the very 
consequence  of  large  unorthodox  measures  by 
central banks could be that they contribute to or 
even create a situation of fiscal dominance.
Under  these  circumstances,  when  should  the 
central bank consider raising interest rates? The 
answer  depends  crucially  on  the  assessment  of 
the economic situation and implicit risks to price 
stability. Where economic problems are caused by 
a collapse of financial markets, the result is much 
different  from  a  “normal”  cyclical  downturn.  If 
economic problems are not of a monetary nature, 
there is certainly no argument for further quanti-
tative easing. Given the situation today, the case 
for ending the period of zero interest rates be-
comes more and more relevant.
Apart from the issue of exiting from unorthodox 
measures, the worldwide discussion has focused 
on the need for a new monetary policy regime 
with an appropriate institutional arrangement. 
The case for independence seemed settled with 
the  experience  that  inflation  correlates  nega-
tively with the degree of independence of the 
central bank. What is the reason for this new 
discussion? Under present institutional arrange-
ments, i.e. representing de jure independence,   
it is the politics of central banks which meets 
with criticism.
When  the  extremes  of  following  a  strict  rule 
and pure discretion are excluded, the distinction 
between  rules  and  discretion  becomes  a  mat-
ter  of  degree.  “Rules  with  discretion”  seems  to 
be a rather vague concept. This is, however, not 
the case once the basic idea is respected that the 
rule should be the compass and deviations from 
the rule have to be explained. A rule-based mon-
etary policy facilitates transparency and makes it 
clear that accountability is related to the achieve-
ment of the final goal. Independence from politi-
cal influence allows the central bank to take the 
appropriate monetary policy decisions. For an in-
dependent central bank with a clear mandate to 
maintain price stability, accountability is restrict-
ed to a “technocratic” task. If the central bank’s 
independent status is exposed to strong political 
opposition, giving up independence de facto may 
be seen as an option to preserve de jure indepen-
dence. However, this would come at the expense 
of undermining the fundament of independence 
for the central bank.
Greater  flexibility  and  tolerance  for  inflation, 
closer coordination with fiscal policy at home, 
and a broader mandate including financial sta-
bility are the main arguments for a reorienta-
tion  of  monetary  policy.  In  light  of  that,  one 
might ask for a new paradigm for the conduct 
of monetary policy. But, learning the right lesson 
would rather bring us to a recollection of lost or 
ignored principles. The new debate on the status 
of central banks demonstrates that the conse-
quences of “rules versus discretion” should be re-
considered and the independence of the central 
bank should be preserved via a single mandate 
and corresponding behavior on the part of the 
central bank. 
A longer version has been published as CFS Working 
Paper 2013/2 and is available at:
www.ifk-cfs.de/publications/working-papers
Otmar Issing
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Events
July
Monday, 1st  EFL Jour Fixe 
5.00 pm  Uncoordinated Circuit Breakers in  
  Fragmented Markets 
  Speaker: Kai Zimmermann, E-Finance Lab
Wednesday, 3rd  ILF Guest Lecture  
7.30 pm  Reforming Securities and Derivatives  
  Trading in the EU: Public vs. Private  
  Markets  
  Speaker: Guido Ferrarini, University of  
  Genoa
Wednesday, 3rd  Applied Microeconomics & Organization  
5.15 pm  Seminar  
  Speaker: Fabian Herweg, LMU Munich
Sunday, 7th –  Conference 
Tuesday, 9th  Marketing Strategy Meets Wall Street III 
Wednesday, 10th  Applied Microeconomics & Organization 
5.15 pm   Seminar  
  Speaker: Dorothea Kübler, TU Berlin
Thursday, 11th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics 
12.15 – 13.45 pm  Speaker: Greg Veramendi, Arizona State  
  University
Thursday, 11th  LEMF Seminar   
  Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly  
  Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund 
  Choice  
  Speaker: Jill E. Fisch, Institute for Law and  
  Economics , University of Pennsylvania Law 
  School
Tuesday, 16th  SAFE Policy Center Gesprächsreihe zu  
8.30 – 9.30 am  Strukturreformen im Europäischen  
  Bankensektor 
  Wiederherstellung privater Haftung und  
  die zukünftige Rolle der Aufsicht  
  Speaker: Elke König, Bundesanstalt für  
  Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Jan Pieter  
  Krahnen, SAFE & CFS  
Tuesday, 16th  Finance Seminar 
4.15 pm  Speaker: Lubos Pastor, University of  
  Chicago Booth School of Business 
Thursday, 18th  Frankfurt Seminar in Macroeconomics   
12.15 – 13.45 pm  Recession Scars and the Growth Potential  
  of Newborn Firms in General Equilibrium  
  Speaker: Petr Sedlacek, University of Bonn
Thursday, 18th  Goethe Business School – Information  
7.00 pm  Session 
  Part-time-Master in Finance   
  Speaker: Uwe Walz, Goethe University
Monday, 22nd  Applied Microeconomics & Organization  
5.15 pm   Seminar 
  Speaker: Katja Seim, Wharton School,  
  University of Pennsylvania
 
August
Monday, 12th –  LEMF Summer School 2013 
Saturday, 17th   Law and Economics of Banking 
10.00 am –   Speaker: Gérard Hertig, ETH Zurich 
5.00 pm  Geoffrey Parsons Miller, New York University
Monday, 26th –  ILF Summer School 
Friday, 6th  Banking and Capital Markets Law
Tuesday, 27th   ILF Conference with Hogan Lovells
Friday, 30th  SAFE Policy Center Summer Academy 
  International Financial Stability: Thought 
  Leadership and Best Practice in Addressing  
  European Banking Regulation  
  Organization: Günter Beck, SAFE &  
  University of Siegen
September
Thursday, 5th –  ICIR Jahreskonferenz 
Friday, 6th   Global Insurance Supervision
Thursday, 18th  Goethe Business School – Information  
7.00 pm  Session
  Part-time-Master in Finance   
  Speaker: Uwe Walz, Goethe University
Wednesday, 18th –  Four Day Finance Seminar 
Saturday, 21st   Financial Risk Management 
9.00 am – 6.00 pm 
Friday, 20th –  European Conference on Household  
Saturday, 21st  Finance
Thursday, 26th  Deutsche Bank Prize in Financial Economics – 
12.00 – 5.30 pm  Award Ceremony and Symposium 
   Banking, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy
Please note that for some events registration is compulsory.
CFS  Center for Financial Studies
EFL  E-Finance Lab
ICIR  International Center for Insurance Regulation
ILF  Institute for Law and Finance
LEMF  Doctorate/PhD Program in Law and Economics  
  of Money and Finance Center of Excellence SAFE | Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
A Cooperation of the Center for Financial Studies and Goethe University Frankfurt